BALKAN ANALYTIC FORUM

BAF1: Normativity

BAF+: Normativity of Art

Belgrade, Serbia, 2023.

Balkan Analytic Forum

BAF1: Normativity

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BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

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ИНСТИТУТ ПО ФИЛОСОФИЯ И СОЦИОЛОГИЯ
INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGY   BULGARIAN ACADEMY of SCIENCES

УНИВЕРЗИТЕТ У БЕОГРАДУ
ФИЛОЗОФСКИ ФАКУЛТЕТ

1838

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**BALKAN
ANALYTIC
FORUM**

BAF1: Normativity

Marina Bakalova (keynote)
The Epistemic Normativity of Music
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Bulgaria

I start from the assumption that music has more suitable means than language to articulate and communicate the phenomenal richness of our inner states. Thanks to that, I claim, listening to music is a source of phenomenal knowledge. Upon attentive listening to music, one can acquire phenomenal knowledge in the form of conceptual competence: i.e. more fine-grained phenomenal concepts or new phenomenal concepts. The acquired knowledge is conceptual, but not verbal.

Knowledge of how something feels like is a powerful trigger for actions and decision making on a personal level. On a more general scale, it promotes survival, social adaptation, empathy, welfare and practical wisdom. Despite the significant role that phenomenal knowledge plays in our lives, philosophers know very little about it.

I argue that, in order to understand phenomenal knowledge properly, we need to keep our eye on artistic expression instead of verbal language. Having said that, there are recent epistemological approaches that enable us to analyze it along the lines of general knowledge (e.g. Sosa 2021). In my talk, I will sketch an elementary epistemic normativity for phenomenal knowledge based on musical expression.

Miloš Vuletić

Contextualism, Wide-Scoping,
and the Hypothetical Given

University of Belgrade, Department of Philosophy, Serbia

The paper explores an account of the role of perceptual experience in conferring positive normative standing upon perceptual judgments and beliefs. The proposed view is an alternative to simple given and hypothetical given accounts of this role. I show that criticism of simple given which motivates the hypothetical given is structurally similar to metaethical concerns with detaching problems. Additionally, hypothetical given is structurally similar to wide-scope rational requirements deployed to solve metaethical detaching problems. I exploit the fact that detaching problems can be solved in a contextualist manner as well, and apply such solution to the case of perceptual judgments.

Constantin Stoenescu
The Normative Structure of Science.
A Deflationary View
University of Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy, Romania

In a famous article published in the year 1942, Robert Merton distinguished between technical (or cognitive) norms and moral (or social) norms. In the case of cognitive ones, Merton mentions two methodological principles, one regarding the adequacy and reliability of empirical evidence, the other regarding the logical consistency and validity, while in the case of moral ones he enumerates universalism, "communism", disinterestedness and organized skepticism. All these norms make up the ethos of science, "that affectively toned complex of values and norms which is held to be binding on the man of science" (Merton). The norms are expressed in the form of prescriptions, proscription and permissions and they are legitimatized in terms of institutional values. This view about the normative structure of science was associated with the so-called strandar model of scientific theory.

After Kuhn's *Structure of Scienctific Revolution* and beginning with the *New philosophy of science* Merton's model was challanged and criticized. Some philosophers highlight the temporality and ambivalence of the norms and values constituting the ethos of science and propose a deviant view point (Barnes and Dolby, 1970). Others, as Ian Mitroff (1974), who studied the Apollo missions, shows that the so-called counternorms (solitariness, particularism, interestedness and organized dogmatism) are equally strong and claimed that the dominance of one set of norms is situationally dependent. Other critics suggest that the norms are just a mixture of social, ideological and verbal stereotypes and conventions used by scientist in their relations with the outsiders. It is better to conceive these norms "as vocabularies of justification, which are used to evaluate, justify and describe the professional actions of scientists, but which are not institutionalised within the scientific community in such a way that general conformity is maintained" (Mulkay, 1976, pp. 653–654).

The subsequent developments mainly concerned the relativism of any normative systems, from methodological to moral ones, from Feyerabend's radical methodological position in *Against method* (1975) to the cognitive relativism assumed by Bruno Latour in his actor network theory (2005).

My aim is to apply and develop for the case of the normative structure of science a project proposed recently (2023) by Paul Horwich in a public lecture regarding a so-called deflationary view in metaethics. As it is easy to anticipate, the approach is similar to the one followed by the deflationist theories of truth.

The debate until now has focused on identifying the norms that guide the scientist's activity. From the deflationary perspective proposed by Horwich, in this case we are not faced with a factual difficulty, but with a one that in principle makes it impossible to identify a universal set of norms. In this sense, following the suggestions that come from Wittgernstein, we will reach adequate results if we accept a pragmatic and pluralistic approach based on the assumption that the norms have a certain contextual use relative to the scientific community.

Gabriel Malagutti

Apriori Shift in Non-Reductionist Accounts of Testimony

University of Lisabon, Portugal. LanCog Research Group

Non-reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, is the view that all one needs to enjoy justified testimonial acceptance is the absence of negative reasons. This framework has mostly been upheld through an *aposteriori* account. Accounts such as Simion (2020)'s testimonial contractarianism, or Graham (2012)'s functionalism, all appeal to an *aposteriori* element in how they justify testimonies positive epistemic status. I will argue that these sorts of accounts are structurally flawed. To see this, I will make use of Lackey (2006)'s Alien Case, the greatest objection to non-reductionist account. The case is one where, in the total absence of defeaters, one is irrational in accepting the alien's testimony. If this assessment is correct, then non-reductionism is false. A number of attempted replies have been made, such as Perrine (2014)'s, but they all ultimately fail, either by being *ad hoc*, taking the alien qua alien as a defeater, or by inadvertently endorsing Faulkner's testimony-types reductionism. This failure in the literature is, again, due to the appeal of an *aposteriori* element, that is restricted to human testimony. Simion's appeal to contingent facts regarding social norms, Graham's notion of contingent etiological functions, and Perrine's background information, are examples of these. They either appeal to facts about humans, or human's usage of testimony. This assessment makes the case that human type testimony has a positive epistemic status, falling under Faulkner's description of reductionism, or takes it that the lack of such information regarding alien's testimonies form a defeater. This latter option ultimately endorses reductionism, for the lack of positive evidence can only be a defeater if one considers positive evidence to be necessary to justify acceptance, such as the reductionist holds. Provided the diagnosis, I will put forward an *apriori* rationalist non-reductionist account. This account comes about from

the realization that language is necessary for testimonial activities: if x testifies → x is a language user. Language, by necessity – I argue –, follows rules and norms that confer reliability to language usage, which testimony inherits. Examples of these are: the Knowledge Rule (assert *p iff* you know that *p*); Lewis's (1975) conventions; and Burge's (1993) Acceptance Principle (we have *apriori* entitlement to accept a proposition presented as true). Additionally, following Burling (2005), I will argue that language is a cognitive ability, demanding rationality. This allows for an inference: If *x* is a language user → *x* is rational. From the realization that *x* is rational, we can expect *x* to follow certain norms, namely, norms promoted by Game Theory, stating that, in most scenarios, the rational action for a given agent is to be truthful and reliable. The perk of this account is that reliability comes about directly from the observation of an instance of testimony. This framework, thus, confers *prima facie* justification to testimony across the board. The apriority of the account enables one to dismiss Lackey's sceptical concerns without appealing to positive reasons, enabling a fruitful reply to Lackey, rescuing non– reductionism in the process. As such, non-reductionist must be *apriori*.

Aleksandra M. Pavlovic (keynote)
What makes us good people? Exploring the Neural Basis of Morality and Empathy
University of Belgrade, FASPER, Serbia

What defines a good person? Is it someone who strictly adheres to societal rules, exhibits virtuous character, demonstrates empathy, or perhaps a combination of all these qualities? In this discussion, we will delve into two critical aspects of this intriguing question: the morality network and the empathy network within the brain.

Research suggests that a "neuromoral" network responsible for responding to moral dilemmas is primarily situated in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and its associated connections, particularly on the right side of the brain. Neurobiological evidence points to the existence of automatic "prosocial" mechanisms that facilitate identification with others as integral components of the moral brain. Individuals with disorders affecting this moral network may exhibit reduced emotional responses to the potential harm caused to others, possibly leading to sociopathic behavior.

Neuroimaging studies have revealed that decision-making processes related to social norms and fairness activate a diverse range of brain areas, including the anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex, and various lateral prefrontal cortices. A quantitative meta-analysis using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has shown that the ventromedial prefrontal regions are distinct in processing social norm representations, while the right insula, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and dorsal cingulate cortices are distinct in processing norm violations.

The neuromoral theory of antisocial behaviors proposes that impairments in the neural circuitry underlying morality serve as a common foundation for antisocial, violent, and psychopathic behaviors in humans. Implicated brain regions include fronto-polar, medial, and ventral prefrontal cortical regions, as well as the anterior cingulate,

amygdala, superior temporal gyrus, and angular gyrus/temporoparietal junction. More recent evidence supports the critical involvement of the insula and cingulate cortices in this neural network, with some evidence suggesting laterality effects.

Further investigation into the components of morality reveals a debate regarding whether cognitive or emotional components are more impaired in offenders. The neuromoral theory emphasizes the emotional feeling of moral wrongness as the primary deficit, while the study of individual brain lesion cases suggests that cognitive components, such as the theory of mind and reward-based decision-making, are involved.

Additionally, we must consider the intriguing findings from the Affectome Project, which challenges the traditional notion of distinct neural circuits for emotion and motivation. These findings suggest significant neural convergence between emotion and motivation, emphasizing the tight interconnection of these two functions in the brain.

Empathy, a complex construct, is likely supported by a multilevel neuronal network. Different subnetworks may facilitate vicarious experiences with the tendency to resonate with the feelings of other individuals, which correlates with the activity of the frontoparietal network, and intuitive understanding of others' emotional states, which correlates with sensorimotor and subcortical networks. Salience network regions may serve as hubs for information processing underlying both dimensions of empathy.

Furthermore, executive functions, which engage shared frontotemporal brain areas, have been shown to correlate with empathic attitudes and prosocial behaviors. Individuals with higher levels of executive functions may exhibit better emotion regulation and reduced distress during empathetic processes.

In conclusion, as we ponder the intricacies of morality, empathy, and executive functions, one question remains: Ultimately, it is we who decide how to behave, or not?

Madelaine Angelova-Elchinova
Intuition-talks and Metanormativity:
What Can Go Wrong?
Sofia University, Bulgaria

In "Philosophy without intuitions", Herman Cappelen demonstrates that intuition-talk is central for both first order and second order philosophy. That applies especially to moral philosophy and epistemology where it is presumed that appeals to intuitions about particular cases is a form of non-inferential justification of normative, first order theories. And while I remain skeptical in regard to what extent an appeal to intuitions can be seriously regarded as a method at all, in my talk I will address a quite different problem, which spurs from the interrelation between demanding normativity and relying on intuitions. I will argue that metanormativity requires that a theory either gives up on intuition-talk or renounces its normative status.

In the beginning of my talk, I construe a very broad definition of normativity which, I purport, is potent enough as to be applied to both epistemic and moral normativity. Normativism will be introduced as a metanormative (or a second order) claim according to which there are some normative requirements that are expressed via directives or evaluatives which, in turn, are applicable to the first order domain. Such reading allows that, while moral normativity and epistemic normativity can be understood as different first order views, they still have a common core within second order normativism, and this common core is required for the successful defense of any or both of them.

In order to defend my central claim, I turn to the methodological role that intuitions play in philosophy. An important feature of intuition-talk methodology is that intuitions are often used as a stepping stone for the construal of different first-order normative claims. I go on to show that no matter whether intuitions are referring to a) beliefs, b) sui-generis states/seemings or c) dispositions to believe, two problems demand an answer:

1) In what respect doxastic justification or moral justification is related to intuition-talk? If doxastic justification refers to our ability to provide good reasons to belief that p or to make a moral judgment, it is important to find out if we classify an intuition that p as a form of *good* reason or *moral* reason. In regards to metanormativity then, the question becomes "To what extent an intuition that p can be presented in evaluative terms?"

2) An agency requirement is somewhat presupposed by first-order normative theories. Both moral and epistemic normative views insist on (at least minimal) levels of behavioral or reflective control that would allow for ascriptions of responsibility, praiseworthiness and blame. It is important to discuss – as a metanormative problem – if the agency requirement of first order normative theories is compatible with the recalcitrance of intuitions.

A majority of the arguments against intuition-talk can be regarded as attacks against the method of appealing to intuitions. I expose a different flaw of intuition-based methodology by arguing that even if there is nothing wrong with the tool itself, relying on intuition-talk and intuitionist methodology is incompatible with first-order normative judgments.

Bin Zhao
Lottery, Neural Phase, and Safety
Peking University, China

According to the safety account of knowledge, one knows that *p* only if one's belief could not easily have been false. The account is open to two different readings which, in turn, give rise to a weak version and a strong version of the safety condition. In this paper, it is argued that, if we opt for the weak version, then we are not able to account for why one's belief in a lottery proposition based on statistical evidence is true as a matter of luck. But, if we opt for the strong version, then we are not able to accommodate some cases of perceptual knowledge. Therefore, the safety account of knowledge is undermined by the lottery case and perceptual knowledge. I then developed the explanationist account of knowledge according to which, one knows that *p* only if one's forming a belief that *p* and *p*'s being true is appropriately explanatorily connected. Unlike the safety account, the explanationist account could find a safe path between the lottery case and perceptual knowledge.

Mariela N. Destéfano

Slurs in inner speech

University of Buenos Aires – CONICET, Argentina

Inner speech could be chiefly defined as the subjective experience of language in the absence of overt auditory articulation (Alderson-Day and Fenyhough 2015). This internal self-directed language is usually distinguished from social and private speech and is conceived to have a key role in behavioral control, self-regulation, planning, working memory, conscious thinking, among other capacities (Vygotsky 1934; Baddeley 1986; Vicente *et al* 2011; Prinz 2007). Generally speaking, inner speech is considered as a problem-solving tool that is expected to improve subject's cognitive and behavioral responses. In addition, it has been proposed that that inner speech also includes an expressive dimension according to which this internal language would emerge from deep states of subjectivity and express them (Fossa 2017). However, as far as I know, no progress has been shown following this line of research.

For this reason, in this talk I would like to deepen on the idea that inner speech has this expressive function that enables to manifest the intimacy of the owner. I will focus on internal episodes of slurs in inner speech. Slurs are expressions associated with contemptuous attitude concerning a group of people identified in terms of its origin or descent ('spic'), race ('nigger'), sexual orientation ('faggot'), ethnia or religion ('kike'), and gender ('whore') (Orlando and Saab 2020). As far as I am concerned, slurs have been studied in the context of overt direct speech and indirect reports (Cepollaro *et al* 2019). However, nothing has been said about the nature of inner slurs and in this context, I will expand the current analysis of slurs strengthening at the same time the expressive characterization of inner speech.

In this talk I will explore four main topics. First, I will study how inner slurs are inserted in inner speech. I will consider that slurs occur in a condensed form of inner speech, in which the semantic and syntactic transformations that accompany internalization are taken to their

conclusion (Fernyhough 2004). Second, I will assess the semantics of inner slurs as an internal use of a stereotype semantics (Orlando and Saab 2020). Third, I will understand the force of internal slurs in terms of what I will call "relief force" according to which the use of the inner expression reduce a negative emotional valence. Fourth, I will relate this expressive use of inner slurs with other functions of inner speech such as self-regulation. I will consider the possibility that inner slurs have certain control over aggressive behavior in social context.

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Larissa Kolias
Testimonial Violence is Doxastically Blameworthy
The University of Calgary, Canada

In this presentation, I examine the relation between doxastic blame and epistemic violence, specifically *testimonial violence*. I argue that although a culpable epistemic agent might not possess the cognitive competence necessary know her testimonial violence is wrong, she will possess the cognitive competence necessary to know that her epistemic reasoning is compromised. This, I will show, implies that the epistemic blameworthiness of culpable agents who commit testimonial violence extends to doxastic blame.

According to Dotson (2011), testimonial violence is an audience's refusal to communicatively reciprocate within a linguistic exchange, irrespective of intent, and is grounded in *pernicious ignorance*. Pernicious ignorance is type of reliable ignorance, i.e., predictable gaps in cognitive resources, that causes harm to others.

We may think that testimonial violence involves not just epistemic responsibility but also *doxastically* responsibility. Doxastic responsibility is a type of epistemic responsibility that looks at what doxastic attitude (i.e., belief, disbelief, or suspension of judgement) an agent epistemically ought to hold toward a proposition given her *immediate* evidence. Unlike other forms of epistemic responsibility, doxastic responsibility is not concerned with ways an agent should better her epistemic standing, such as by gathering more evidence or fostering epistemic virtues. Doxastic responsibility is only concerned with what an agent S epistemically ought to have believed at time *t* given the evidence *already* possessed by S at *t*.

Because one's cognitive resources are in a dependency relation with one's doxastic attitudes, this implies that one's cognitive resources can be subject to doxastic responsibility. However, there is an issue. Beginning with Alston (1985, 1988, 1989), many believe that we cannot

be responsible nor blameworthy for our doxastic attitudes, because our doxastic attitudes are not subject to our *direct voluntary control*, and an agent can only be responsible for that which is under her direct voluntary control. Within this ongoing debate, Forrai (2021) has recently proposed that an agent is responsible for her doxastic attitudes on the basis of *cognitive competence*, or the ability to reliably acquire beliefs that comply with epistemic norms (i.e., truth, justified belief, and knowledge). According to Forrai, S at *t* is doxastically responsible for *p* just in case S at *t* possessed the cognitive competence necessary to form the correct doxastic attitude regarding *p*.

Given that Dotson's definition of pernicious ignorance involves *reliable* gaps in cognitive resources, and that cognitive competence is the ability to reliably acquire beliefs that comply with epistemic norms, it may appear that Forrai's view denies that testimonial violence can involve doxastic responsibility. However, I argue against this. I contend that, *even if* it is true that pernicious ignorance involves a lack of cognitive competence, the competence required to know when one epistemically ought to suspend judgement on *p* is different from the competence required to know when one epistemically ought to believe or disbelieve *p*. Namely, all that is required for S to responsibly suspend judgement on *p* is S's ability to know that she does not have the competence necessary to responsibly believe or disbelieve *p*. Given this, I maintain that in instances of culpable testimonial violence, an agent will always possess the competence necessary to responsibly suspended judgement on the set of doxastic attitudes, those which are in a dependency relation to her pernicious ignorance, that informed her testimonial violence. Hence, I conclude, the epistemic blame of capable agents who commit testimonial violence will always extend to doxastic blame.

Ronan Ó Maonaile
On The Irreducibility of Fittingness
University of Reading, United Kingdom

Fittingness is an important concept in contemporary metaethics and normative theory. Broadly speaking, fittingness is a normative relation which holds between attitudes or actions on the one side, and people, things or situations on the other. Recently, a debate has emerged regarding whether ought, good or fitting, or none of these, is *the* fundamental normative concept to which all others can be reduced. Yet despite this concerted interest, it remains unclear what it actually means for x to *fit* y. In this talk, I show that fittingness is a 'thin complementarity relation' which is irreducible to other normative concepts and is best understood in terms of the specific nature of individual attitudes, where the complementarity between a particular attitude and its object is grounded by non-normative features of the two.

I do this in three steps. First, I reject the suggestion that for an attitude or action to be fitting is for it to be good to have or do. I reject it because there are a host of counterexamples, not only in contentious cases such as fitting envy (can it ever be fitting to envy someone?), but also in more clear cut cases: I argue that while an act of punishment can be fitting, it is never intrinsically good.

I then reject the proposal that a fitting attitude is an attitude one ought to have. Specifically, I deny Thomas Hurka's (2022) claim that fittingness is a thick concept, i.e. it has both descriptive and normative content. Hurka defines the descriptive content of fittingness as a 'complementarity relation' which grounds a thin normative component indistinguishable from ought. I argue that the concept of fittingness is in fact a thin complementarity relation distinguishable from ought which has no descriptive content. Thick fittingness concepts are those such as admirable and shameful, which involve a thin complementarity relation grounded by specific features of the given emotions and the objects they fit.

Finally, I develop this account by expanding on Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni's (2021) notion of 'attitudinal profiles': for each distinct attitude, the fittingness conditions are best understood in terms of the specific nature of that attitude. For example, *fitting admiration* (the admirable) is a match between an attitude whose profile involves a tendency to engage with and emulate an object or person which instantiates an achievement of some kind. *Fitting shame* (the shameful) on the other hand is the concept of aversive tendencies matched with a transgressive action. I extend the notion of attitudinal profiles beyond Deonna and Teroni's action tendencies and conclude that fittingness is best understood not in terms of traditional normative concepts such as goodness or oughtness, but rather as a *sui generis* normative relation that can be fully explained in terms of the constitution of the relata.

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Timothy Williamson (keynote)
Compliance before Obligation and Permission
New College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom

I will argue that it is confusing and potentially misleading to formulate many norms in terms of deontic modal categories such as obligation and permission, because deontic modals depend on a contextually specified parameter for the set of relevant possible worlds which turns out to be extraneous to the norm itself. The latter is fully specified by the condition for complying with it, without need of the modal dimension. The benefits of the non-modal approach will be illustrated with reference to a truth norm for belief. A debate about that norm has involved increasingly complicated qualifications of the truth norm, but the fuss turns out to be an artefact of working with modal formulations of the norm, and can be elegantly avoided by focus on the compliance condition alone.

Amber Riaz (invited)
Moral Learning and Experience
LUMS, Pakistan

What is the role of experience in the acquisition of moral knowledge? Traditionally, two roles have been suggested in response to this question: an enabling role and an evidential role. However, in addition, experience also plays what I call a *training* role, by honing and calibrating our moral judgement and making us more skillful at applying moral terms. If we categorize the training role of experience as merely enabling, then the danger is that far too much knowledge will count as a priori, even relatively uncontroversial cases of a priori moral knowledge. However, if the role is taken to be evidential, then far too much knowledge will count as a posteriori. The most plausible verdict is that the a priori-a posteriori distinction is not deep enough to be of much significance (Williamson 2007; 2013; 2020).

A key challenge for me is to provide an account of the kind of experiential feedback we rely on in sufficiently developing the relevant skills necessary for the acquisition of moral knowledge. I address this challenge with the help of examples. I then address the further challenge as to whether this account is question begging in favour of one's existing moral beliefs.

Emily McWilliams

Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, and Two Kinds of Agency
Duke Kunshan University, China

Many *evidentialists* endorse a traditional view of epistemic and practical normativity on which all epistemic reasons are reasons for belief and all practical reasons are reasons for action.[1] Others have argued both that (1) there can be practical reasons for belief[2], and (2) there can be epistemic reasons for action.[3] I argue that parties on opposing sides of prominent debates over (1) and (2) talk past one another. This is because they focus on what reasons can be reasons for (actions vs. beliefs), while eliding a more fundamental distinction between *different kinds of agency*, exercises of which those reasons get a normative grip on.

The two kinds of agency are what Hieronymi (2006, 2009) calls *managerial control* and *evaluative control.* Managerial control is the familiar agential control that we exercise through voluntary, intentional action. Evaluative control is the agential control we exercise in forming and having attitudes like belief and intention.[4] In forming a belief about p, we exercise evaluative agency by settling for ourselves whether p. Hieronymi argues convincingly that this is a form of agential control even though it is not voluntary in the sense intentional action is.

Those on opposing sides of the debates over (1) and (2) talk past each other by eliding this distinction at crucial points in their

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1   To avoid confusion: I explain in the paper that evidentialism refers to two different views. One is a view about epistemic justification, which is often taken to have the implication that there cannot be epistemic reasons for action. The second is the view that only evidence can be a reason for belief.

2   Those who argue in favor of this label themselves *pragmatists.* For relevant discussion, see e.g., Shah 2003, 2006, 2011; Rinard 2015, 2017; Leary 2017; Berker 2018; Vahid 2022.

3   For relevant discussion, see e.g., Kornblith 1983; Hall and Johnson 1998; Booth 2006, 2009; Field 2009; Friedman 2020, forthcoming; Singer and Aronowitz, forthcoming.

4   I include 'having' here because for Hieronymi, believing is an activity. For present purposes, we can remain neutral on whether this is right. Those who disagree may focus on the agency we exercise in forming beliefs.

arguments. The surprising result is that their arguments are consistent with one another, though they focus on different claims.[5] In brief, evidentialists' crucial claims concern reasons that bear on exercises of evaluative agency. They understand *epistemic reasons* as all and only reasons that guide exercises of evaluative agency in forming beliefs. Those who oppose them focus on reasons that bear on exercises of managerial agency. But both slip unannounced between discussions of the two kinds of agency.

My discussion explains why these arguments have not convinced their opponents. It also clarifies the importance of current discussions of zetetic epistemology, by suggesting further questions about whether we should move beyond the traditional view, adopting a broader conception of epistemic reasons that includes, for instance, reasons that guide managerial agency during inquiry.

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5   I show how this applies both to debates over pragmatic reasons for belief (e.g., Rinard 2015, 2017; Shah 2006, 2011) and to debates over epistemic reasons for action (e.g., Kelly 2003; Stapleford and McCain 2021; Singer and Aronowitz Forthcoming).

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Leora Dahan Katz & Daniel Telech

Symmetrical Retribution

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Theorists of punishment disagree about the normative support that desert supplies. On one popular view, desert renders punishment permissible (in the face of the objection against the deliberate imposition of harm), though it does not generate *reasons in favor* of punishing, which must be found elsewhere, generally in the positive consequences afforded by punishment, such as deterrence, rehabilitation, and other non-retributive goods. This contrasts with a stronger view of desert, as providing reason (for some theorists, *obligatory reason*) in favor of punishing. The latter view is generally taken to be the more difficult to defend—for the idea of there being positive reasons to setback the interests of, or harm, an agent, for no further end, is thought to be morally dubious—while the former view (on which desert merely renders permissible, or *licenses*, punishment) is generally taken to be the more plausible view.

In this paper, proceeding from reflection on the normative role that desert plays with respect to praise and reward (or what might be termed, 'positive retribution'), we present a challenge for the weaker, licensing, view. This approach, we propose, provides a corrective of sorts to the near-exclusive focus in the literature on retribution on desert of negative or harmful responses, such as blame and punishment ('negative retribution'). Though there may be special practical importance to getting clear on negative retribution, as Glover (1970: 72) writes, "[r]etributive justice concerns giving people what they deserve, but they deserve praise or reward, as well as blame or punishment." While it is possible that reward and punishment are asymmetrical in the kind of normative support they gain from being deserved, there is a defeasible presumption here in favor of symmetry. We argue in its favor of this presumption of symmetry, pointing to reasons to

take this to be the case, placing the burden on those who would argue against this presumption to give an acceptable account to the contrary. With this presumption of symmetry in hand, we argue that it is implausible that one's deserving a reward is a matter of its being merely *permissible* to give one their reward, putting pressure thereby on the licensing view of deserved punishment. Presumably, it's *permissible* to benefit an agent by rewarding her independently of whether she is deserving of reward. But if the desert-base is to do any normative work, it must make a normative difference. And it *will* do so, if it provides a favoring reason to reward the deserving (even if we also accept that there already was *some* reason to in favor of rewarding).

One might reject the normative force of desert altogether, but insofar as one concedes desert's force, the challenge we develop here provides new reasons for accepting recent analyses of desert as serving a 'favoring' function (Berman, 2021; McKenna 2019), rather than 'licensing' function. The view that to deserve some interest-affecting treatment provides reason in favor of affecting the deserving agent's interests accordingly is thus poised to provide a symmetrical account of deserved punishment and reward.

Christos Panayides (invited)

Aristotle on the Priority of the Polis Over the Individual

University of Nicosia, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Cyprus

In *Politics* I 2 (1253a18–29) Aristotle makes a controversial claim: that the polis is prior in nature to the individual. The aim of this paper is to reconstruct this thesis. According to recent scholarship, there are two main ways to understand priority in nature in Aristotle. It may be construed as existential priority or as priority in being. It is argued that: (a) The first option is problematic; it cannot give us a viable reading of the thesis in *Politics* I 2, whereas (b) The second option may provide us with a plausible solution to the puzzle at hand. Furthermore, it is argued that the exegetical plausibility of the proposed approach to the thesis in *Politics* I 2 may be bolstered if we note that, for Aristotle, the polis is a particular kind of hylomorphic whole.

Peter Shiu-HwaTsu

Can Ethics Be Naturalised?
Common Human Nature, Moral Relativism,
and Confucian Philosophy

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In this talk, my goal is to explore whether David Wong's common-human-nature-oriented naturalism can sit well with his pluralistic moral relativism and his Confucian philosophy. I will argue firstly that his Confucian philosophy would pose a challenge to his project of naturalizing ethics. Second, I would argue that his common-human-nature-oriented naturalism would enfeeble his pluralistic moral relativism.

It has long been an issue of great controversy since Moore published *Ethica Principia* in 1903 whether ethics can be naturalized. David Wong, along with colleagues, chose the side of naturalism and made a distinctive contribution to this issue by arguing that the categoricity of moral imperatives is grounded in common human nature. Like any philosophical position, Wong's distinctive brand of naturalism (or what he and colleagues dub as 'Duke naturalism', of which Wong is a chief supporter) can be judged in its own terms. In fact, this is the approach adopted by Wong's commentators in the moral psychology anthology edited by Sinnott– Armstrong. And there're exciting exchanges of spars and parries between Wong et al. and the commentators. Yet, it should be noted that Wong is also a famous champion of moral relativism as well as an eminent scholar on Confucian philosophy. When situated in this larger framework of Wong's overall philosophical thought, it is at least initially puzzling how Wong's naturalism with common human nature at its core squares with his pluralistic moral relativism and his expertise on Confucian philosophy. As I see it, there are at least two potential conflicts. First, it is a well-known fact that there is a debate amongst ancient Confucian scholars about whether human nature is intrinsically good or bad. In

the light of this debate, it can naturally be wondered: if our common human nature turns out to be bad (or at least mixed), could Wong's naturalistic project of grounding the categoricity of moral imperatives in our common human nature still go through? The debate in Confucian philosophy on human nature poses a potential problem to Wong's naturalism. Second, in defending his pluralistic moral relativism against the charge that it permits gruesome practices such as female circumcision as long as they conform with local morality, Wong maintains that our common human nature poses a constraint on what morality is adequate (or true), and therefore can legitimately rule out such gruesome practices as inadequate. However, this sort of defense based on Wong's commonhuman-nature-oriented naturalism seems to suggest, contra his pluralistic moral relativism, that there is a single true morality: it is the morality that is in line with our common human nature; anything that violates it is inadequate or untrue. If so, it seems that if Wong still wished to cling to his pluralistic moral relativism, he might have to quit using our common human nature as an adequacy test.

In the light of the above problems, I thought it would be a useful exercise to try to clarify Wong's position on naturalism, relativism, and Confucian philosophy as regards common human nature and see if they can fit together. In my talk, I would argue, however, that Wong's common-human-nature-oriented naturalism might enfeeble his relativism to the extent that it does not quite live up to its purported task of refuting universalism (the view that there is only one true morality). Moreover, I will argue that our common human nature, if there's such thing, is too thin a leg to support Wong's ambition to naturalise the categoricity of moral imperatives.

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Anna M. Ivanova

Intrapersonal Permissivism and Truth-Seeking Behaviour

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A well-established epistemic norm for belief revision is basing one's doxastic states on the evidence possessed. For any particular account of the evidential support relation, a question arises as to whether one and the same set of evidence may afford for more than one rationally acceptable attitude toward a proposition. Permissivism is (minimally) the view that at least in some situations the answer to this question is positive. In the context of doxastic voluntarism, this thesis is sometimes defended by means of a suggested incompatibility of human epistemic values. In my presentation, I will argue against this form of intrapersonal permissivism defending 1) redundancy of any belief that diverges from the prescriptions of available evidence and 2) consistency of the epistemic principles that guide human truth-seeking behaviour.

I will analyze versions of the argument for permissivism first laid out by William James (James 1897) in order to show that the goal of attaining more true beliefs does not in fact provide instrumentalist rationality for doxastic attitudes that go beyond (or fall short of) the probability measure assigned by one's set of evidence. I will argue that any epistemic as well as any pragmatic function that a belief acquired in this manner may perform is also satisfied by the corresponding state that fits the evidence – e.g. the state of proper conjecture or presupposition. In addition, I will try to demonstrate that the chances of attaining true beliefs in the latter case are ultimately higher for the agent's overall system of knowledge. Finally, I will comment on how this argument from redundancy relates to some contemporary accounts of interpersonal permissivism.

Vasilikui Xiromeriti

Collective Deliberation in Epistemic Groups: Lessons From Deliberative Democracy

Jean-Moulin 3 University, France

During the past decades, collective deliberation has received much attention in normative philosophy. There is an outstanding number of studies addressing the procedural and substantive norms of democratic deliberation regarding moral and legal reasoning, citizen participation, and policy making. It is true though that, even when it insists on the epistemic benefits of discussion and argumentation, most of this literature restricts the domain of deliberation to practical questions. Scientific reasoning generally falls out of the scope of deliberative democracy, since it is supposed to be governed by agent and context-independent criteria. Thus, argumentation is restricted in information sharing, including higher order information about each other's competence on the question. Yet, contemporary epistemology insists on the role of values in scientific reasoning and the persistence of non-factual disagreement in scientific groups. Collective deliberation – that is, weighing reasons for and against alternative options – has an important role in overcoming disagreement in scientific contexts. It is also claimed that argumentation and discussion could contribute in identifying and correcting structural biases in science, such as androcentric interests and values, leading to epistemically more reliable or objective judgments. However, a normative account of scientific deliberation is still lacking. The aim of this paper is to sketch out a normative account of collective deliberation in scientific contexts through an application of deliberative literature to epistemology. Collective deliberation plays indeed an important role in scientific practice, allowing scientists to overcome uncertainty and disagreement through interactive argumentation and mutual criticism. Relying on Bratman's analysis of joint action, I claim that scientific deliberation is to be understood as shared reasoning by means of which

scientists and scientific groups get to coordinate their potentially conflicting means (methods, hypotheses, experimental designs etc.) with a view to coming up with a common judgement regarding a theoretical question. This analysis of scientific deliberation suggests that epistemic rationality is instrumental and needs to be examined in its social dimension. Justification of scientific results is a matter of how they are decided in the scientific community. Deliberative democracy seems thus relevant in addressing the norms of scientific reasoning. By drawing attention to the epistemic aims of scientific reasoning as collaborative activity, I will rely on democratic theories of deliberation in order to distinguish procedural and substantive normative criteria for deliberation in science.

Timur Uçan

Machines and Us: The Comparison of Machines and Humans at the Testof the Problematic of Solipsism
Bordeaux Montaigne University Mixt Research Unit Sciences, Philosophy, Humanities, France

This paper has for objective to propose a reflexion about the limits of the comparison or the analogy between humans and machines: to which extent does the metaphor of the human machine render possible the extension of the necessarily nonrestrictive limits of intelligibility? If humans are under some aspects *like* machines and inversely, another thing is to suppose 'affirming' that humans *are* machines and inversely. This paper will first propose a resolution of this problem. To achieve this task we shall study a conception of criticism of solipsism elaborated by C. I. Lewis which consists equally in an interpretation of the history of philosophy which integrates advances achieved in mathematical logic and physics at the beginning of the XXth century. We shall see that this conception of solipsism is the one according to which us humans could have been, could be and are reducible to robots or machines, that this difference could and should be without loss denied by us. Under some aspects, and this shall be the purpose of the second part, Turing seems to be claiming exactly *that* which whose Lewis claimed the monstruous character, the solipsistic supposition. For if the Turing test is one, no problem whatsoever should be raised by the affirmation that some machine thinks. Certainly, the dischargment of the execution of some operations or actions to some machines, and the production of machines which render possible the realization of tasks unrealizable otherwise is conceivable, and the personification by humanization or biologization of machines is not problematic as such. Nevertheless, the reconception of solipsism and the displacement of the problematic of solipsism effectuated by Turing is not without posing problem, for if the metaphorical reduci-

bility of the human to the machine and of the machine to the human is not problematic as not implicative or possibly implicative of the literal irreducibility or the one to the other and inversely (that is to say independently of the grief that can be expressed against methodological solipsism which ultimately is not different from solipsism) is rendered almost unintelligible if reduced only to this aspect taken by Turing. This is the resolution, I shall realize in the third part of this text. Indeed, Wittgenstein, in the *Philosophical Investigations*, by his criticisms of reductionism and functionalism, brings decisive elements of resolution as much to a problem posed by Lewis' critical conception of solipsism as to the one posed by Turing's conception of solipsism. Wittgenstein there also brings decisive elements to establish in which sense methodological solipsism is ultimately not differentiable from solipsism (aspects explicated relatively independently by Putnam and Descombes).

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Mircea Dumitru (keynote)
On the Normativity of Logic
University of Bucharest, Romanian Academy, Romania

Modal and normative concepts are plenitudinous. Here there are some of the most often used concepts in philosophical explanations and investigations: the necessary truths of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics, respectively; the necessary connections among events or states of affairs in the natural world; the necessary or unconditional principles of ethics; and many other forms of necessary truth or connection, forms of oughts, of should a.s.o.

It is quite reasonable, then, that this abundance raise the legitimate question: how much *real* diversity are we really having here? Are all those modal and normative concepts independent from each other or they may be reducible to just one kind or to very few kinds of primitive modal concepts? And if the latter, are there some irreducible ways in which a truth might be necessary or a connection might hold by necessity?

The leading concept which is constitutive for my position regarding the normativity of logic — or at least the way in which I make sense of this topic — is an anti-reductionist metaphysical stance according to which there are three main forms of necessity, viz. the metaphysical, the natural, and the normative; and each of them is irreducible to the others or to any other form of necessity.

In what sense, or senses, can logic be said to be normative? To give an answer to this question, it pays off to discuss the thesis of the normativity of logic within the current debate between logical exceptionalism and logical anti-exceptionalism, respectively. I examine that metaphysical anti-reductionist stance against a position which supports the exceptional status of logic amongst other sciences.

Radmila Jovanović Kozlowski &
Andrej Jandrić (invited)

Normative Account of the Laws of Nature
University of Belgrade, Department of Philosophy, Serbia

In contemporary discussions about the laws of nature, the dominant view is so-called *Humeanism* – the account derived from David Hume's writings and advocated by David Lewis. According to Humeans, scientific laws are nothing more than generalisations obtaining in virtue of the totality of facts in the global space-time Humean Mosaic. In order to distinguish between merely accidental generalisations and lawful generalisations, Humeans typically appeal to Lewis's Best System Account – laws are those generalisations which are entailed by the ideal axiomatic system for our world, i.e. a system containing true propositions about the Mosaic which obtains the best balance between simplicity and informativeness. We believe that this descriptivist view of laws meets some insurmountable difficulties. The first one is that Humeans cannot account for idealisations in science which are widely spread in scientific practice, especially in modelling. The second difficulty for Humeans is to explain statistical laws, such as, for instance, the law expressing the probability of radioactive decay. Finally, Humeans have a problem elucidating the stability of the laws of nature. Therefore, we will contest the descriptivist view of laws and claim that the laws of nature must exhibit some form of normativity.

Farbod Akhlaghi (invited)
Misreading Moore and Why It Matters
Christ's College, Cambridge, Trinity College, Dublin

The terms of meta-ethical debate in the last hundred years have largely been set by the Moore of *Principia Ethica*. According to the received story, Moore argued for a form of moral non-naturalism commonly called 'Mooreanism': the view that there exist *sui generis* non-natural moral properties, relations, *inter alia*, inconsistent with a naturalistic view of reality. This received story is, I argue, false. The Moore of *Principia Ethica* was not a Moorean. Moreover, I argue that this misreading has had profound consequences for meta-ethical debate to date, such that redressing it allows us to see how we may hope to make progress in debates in meta-ethics – in particular, in moral metaphysics – that have stagnated.

Christos Kyriacou

Epistemic Rationality, Eliteness and Reference Magnetism
University of Cyprus,
Department of Classics and Philosophy, Cyprus

As I have argued elsewhere, if we are to avoid universal skepticism and self-defeat, some minimal reliability with the meaning and reference determination of the predicate 'epistemic rationality' should be taken to be *explanatorily indispensable*. Roughly, this is because if any skeptical argument is to be rational *at all* (or indeed any other argument), then some minimal reliability with the application of 'epistemic rationality' *must* be the case. This result implies that, in broadly Cartesian fashion, it is plausible to think that there are some epistemic rationality constraints (or requirements) that any rational argument, of necessity, should abide by. Minimal reliability with 'epistemic rationality' is one of them and elsewhere I have tried to conceptually excavate and bring to light some more indispensable epistemic rationality norms.

Detractors could argue that I am missing the skeptic's point because epistemic rationality *itself* is subject to a skeptical argument and, therefore, we are not making much progress. For example, we can use a skeptical argument from deep epistemic disagreement about rationality (cf. Clarke-Doane (forth.)). Are we talking about Foley (1987) rationality, Nozick (1993) rationality*, Quine and Ullian (1970) rationality**, or what?. This is a serious challenge to be reckoned with, if we are not to beg the question against the skeptic about epistemic rationality.

But epistemic rationality seems to provide us with a semantic grip on what is harder, if not outright implausible, to be essentially contestable. If epistemic rationality is subject to radical skepticism and there is no argument that privileges some *elite* epistemic rationality property, then we are doomed to universal skepticism and its dire implications.

Some, no doubt, could try to resist this skeptical implication, or would be happy to bite the bullet, embrace a universally skeptical result and look to ameliorate the implications, but I am not very optimistic of the prospects of such radically revisionary metaepistemological projects. This is because of the severe problems such a version of radical skepticism would incur.[1]

Suppose then that we have some minimal reliability with reference determination with regard to 'epistemic rationality'. In light of the explanatory indispensability of epistemic rationality, let us say that epistemic rationality is an *elite, referentially magnetic property* in the sense that the corresponding predicate must minimally reliably refer to the rationality property (as if the property has magnetic qualities and attracts the predicate's reference).[2] As I understand eliteness, roughly, elite properties are metaphysically fundamental properties that are objectively explanatorily indispensable for rational argument (cf. Kyriacou (forth.-a)). I take it that such elite properties and relations include epistemic rationality, reference and truth. If this is the case, then we are somehow stuck with some minimally reliable reference to 'epistemic rationality' because it is explanatorily indispensable.

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1   Although I am kind of sympathetic to skepticism about much of our knowledge claims myself (see Kyriacou (2017a, 2020, 2021a, 2021c), I would baulk at universal skepticism, which includes skepticism about epistemic rationality (see Kyriacou 2016, 2018, 2020, forth.-a, forth-b, forth-c). See Kyriacou (forth.-b, forth.-c) for some discussion of different kinds of skepticism and some criticism of versions of universal skepticism, such as Unger's (1975) and Rinard's (forth.). Streumer (2017) is another universal skeptic-error theorist about all normative reasons, moral and epistemic.

2   Eklund (2017) discusses elite properties and reference magnetism (pp. 29–32) but does not consider the conception of eliteness and reference magnetism suggested here.

Andrei Ionuț Mărăşoiu

Epistemic desiderata, context-sensitive assertibility and truth

University of Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy, Romania

In the backdrop of work by Ramsey and Tarski on the semantic conception of truth, identifying which propositions are true might perhaps be seen as boiling down to identifying which propositions should be asserted. If that were the case, then substantive theories of truth may be reconceived along the lines of substantive theories of assertibility. That is not, however, what we find in the literature(s) on assertion, and this is a puzzle I start from.

Assertibility seems to be a notion at the juncture of at least three different traditions. One is a tradition which considers warranted assertibility in the background of our limited epistemic perspectives and of the norms of inquiry and dialogue governing our partial and fallible knowledge. A second is a tradition which identifies which propositions ought to be asserted with those which form part of a putatively realizable ideally completed science. A yet third tradition focused on pragmatic encroachment and emphasizes the interests that influence which propositions get asserted (and perhaps do so as a matter of principle). The variety of these traditions, and the little traffic between their contentions, might give us pause.

One key challenge I articulate, then, concerns how to integrate these various traditions in a coherent notion of assertibility that might do them justice. I argue that the challenge could conceivably be met by appealing to a conception put forward by William Alston, according to whom a context-sensitive mix of epistemic desiderata is always at work (differently in different epistemic contexts) in identifying which propositions ought to be asserted.

However, Alston's strategy relies, as he himself acknowledges, on regarding truth as the core primary epistemic desideratum, that all other epistemic desiderata track. If this key assumption is challenged (as

Alston's contextualist opponent is likely to insist), then it is no longer clear that we can preserve the connection between (even ideal) assertibility and truth. I end by considering how this debate is influenced by the differences between pluralism concerning substantive theories of truth, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, pluralism concerning various epistemic desiderata, of which truth might be only one.

Indalécio Robson Rocha

Unconditionality of Right on Kant
Federal Universityof Paraná, Brazil

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how legal deduction based on freedom can contribute to the normativity of right. It enjoys of the debate on the distinction between ethics and right as a strategy to address the arguments of this article. In this context, it is argued that Kantian right is derived from practical freedom and is a subspecies of morality, from which its unconditional normative force derives. This connection can be made from the objective practical reality of right, through which a singular, unconditional legal-normative externality is perceptible, which should not be reduced to the factual reality of positive law. The consequence of these arguments is that, for legal accountability to be normatively consistent, it must be based on juridical reasons, that is, argumentative evidence that can be fundamentally traced back to freedom. This at all levels of republican powers (legislative, executive and judiciary), otherwise the attribution of accountability will be irrational. In the end, it is suggested that the technical notion of the Latin dogmatics of right, legal claim ("pretensão jurídica" in Portuguese from Brazil), can offer investigative evidence for the definition of a legal maxim consistent with that notion of legal externality.

João Carlos Salles Pires da Silva
Ernest Sosa's Theory of Telic Normativity

Federal University of Bahia, Philosophy Department, Brasil
Visiting scholar at Rutgers' Philosophy Department

Ernest Sosa is one of the most important contemporary philosophers. His work constitutes its field of reflection, now taking the form of a theory of telic normativity. Telic normativity is inherent to actions, and attempts that characterize human performances, being telic because they are aimed at ends and often normative because we say they are better if successful and, therefore, if they reach their objective. It is also better for attempts to manifest competence and attain success through competence, not by chance. That is why we prefer persuasion to the use of force, a good diagnosis to mere guessing, and an expert's advice to the charlatan's opinion. Also, we attribute merit to regular athletic performances rather than casual successes. After all, as Sosa reminds us, "to reach Larissa through ignorant luck is not to flourish." Tim Crane, a highly respected scholar, announced to the four winds: "I'm rather surprised to say this, but I think Ernest Sosa may have solved epistemology." Suppose Crane is correct and Sosa's proposal has the intended scope. In that case, the limits of possible experience will have been redefined from an epistemic point of view, as if Sosa carried out a new Cartesian revolution. The specific aims of this presentation are, at first, to show this new theory (notably, the shifting of position in his work on epistemic modalities such as "sensitivity," "safety," and "security") but also, in a second moment, to explain how and why Sosa is going forward just after achieving the current stage of his reflection – that is, now formulating a "dawning light epistemology," with which he confronts us a work in progress that benefits a lot, as will also be shown, from his more recent and peculiar dialogue with Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*.

Heather Rabenberg
Epistemic Reasons Balance Permissively
SUNY Brockport, USA

Suppose I have epistemic reasons that support belief in the proposition that *p*, and I have epistemic reasons that support belief in the proposition that not-*p* to the same degree. In this situation, most epistemologists, it seems, would say that I ought not believe either <*p*> or <not*p*>, and that I ought instead to suspend judgment concerning <*p*>. Using Selim Berker's terminology, let us describe this view as the view that epistemic reasons *balance prohibitively*. Most philosophers also take it for granted that *practical* reasons, on the other hand, balance *permissively*. Moreover, this is taken to be one of the central differences between practical rationality and epistemic or theoretical rationality.

My aim in this talk is to argue that epistemic reasons balance *permissively*. More specifically, I will argue that when my epistemic reasons in favor of believing <*p*> and believing <not-*p*> are balanced, I am permitted to believe <*p*>, or believe <not-*p*>, or suspend judgment about whether *p*.

My talk has two main sections. In the first, I offer a very simple positive argument that epistemic reasons balance permissively. The basic idea guiding this argument is that a person might permissibly desire the acquisition of true belief more than she desires the avoidance of false belief. For example, a person might permissibly be of a generally risk-seeking character, having less risk-aversion than others, and this risk-seeking character might give this person a stronger desire for true belief than for avoidance of false belief. Such a person might, in a case in which her evidence that *p* and her evidence that not-*p* are balanced, believe one or the other proposition in order to have a chance at a true belief. Furthermore, if she desires true belief more than she desires the avoidance of false belief, then there is *no way* to accomplish her primary goal by suspending judgment right now,

whereas *just believing* that *p* or that not-*p* at least gives her a chance of accomplishing this goal.

Suppose this simple positive argument gives us some reason to lean towards the permissive balancing view. This simple argument has brought out that the prohibitive balancing view precludes risk-seeking, or perhaps even obligates risk-aversion. We might wonder—why, then, is the prohibitive balancing view so popular? I address this question in the second main section of my talk, in which, I argue against what seem to me to be the four best possible rationales for the claim that epistemic reasons balance *prohibitively*. The four rationales derive from various types of epistemic frameworks, but all fail, I argue, to justify the prohibitive balancing view.

Taken on their own, the negative arguments I defend in the second main section might be understood to justify only the claim that if epistemic reasons balance prohibitively, then this is a brute fact. Now, given the confidence with which the prohibitive balancing view is assumed among epistemologists, this conclusion alone would be surprising. However, because I also give a positive argument in favor of the permissive balancing view, I believe that my negative arguments leave us with good all-things-considered reason to favor the permissive balancing view.

Yury Tikhonravov
Normative Pluralism and the Objective List Theory
Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milano

Objective list theory essentially boils down to two points: (1) there is more than one final good (e.g., pleasure), and these goods are not reducible to each other; (2) the final goods are such whether or not you know about or aspire to them. For example, freedom from addictions, the limit of which is Buddhist nirvana, was first recognized by people as a final value two and a half thousand years ago, and today not everyone is aware of it or strives for it. Nevertheless, it fulfills all the attributes of a final value.

Each final value is an independent evaluation criterion. There is no abstract "good" or "bad," "better" or "worse" outside of one final value or another (unless you count the use of several final values at once).

Each final value sets its own rating scale, at the top of which it is itself. For example, in terms of pleasure, pleasure itself is best, and everything else is judged by how much it contributes to pleasure. In terms of health, health itself is best, and everything else is judged by how much it contributes to health. In terms of respect, respect itself is best, and everything else is judged by how much it contributes to respect. And so on.

For a hedonist, who has chosen pleasure as their supreme value and devotes their life to pleasure, pleasure as such is the final justification for all her actions. This person knows no other morality than the hedonistic one. For them there is no problem of "innocent pleasures." When you talk about "innocent pleasure," not pleasure per se, "important knowledge," not knowledge per se, "significant achievements," not achievements per se, and so on, you introduce some additional criterion, that is, you mix in some other final value. Often in such cases you are unconsciously talking about binary final values,

that is, final values that are formed from the integration of two single final values.

You can even build a nihilistic normative system. "The will, ignited by the knowledge that non-being is better than being (...) is the supreme principle of morality," writes Philipp Mainländer in his *The Philosophy of Redemption* (1875), showing us that non-being as a value meets the criterion of normativity.

It is extremely difficult to speak of abstract morality or morality outside one or another final value. So when you speak of morality, you often by default (and sometimes unconsciously) refer to Christian (post-Christian or crypto-Christian) morality, Confucian (post-Confucian or crypto-Confucian) morality, and so on. And at the center of every such teaching is some final value.

If it is difficult to imagine an entire normative system based on a particular value, it is not a final value. So, being a source of a normative system is one of the final value attributes. Each final value gives rise to its own normative system and its own particular way of life.

Miroslava Trajkovski

Normativity, validity and semiotic implication

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Validity of an inference depends on the implication involved, as Harry Field stresses "our views about implication constrain our views about how we ought to reason, or (perhaps better) about the proper interrelations among our beliefs."[1] Hence, according to Field the relation of implication "has a broadly normative component."[2]

There are two ways in which we can speak of the implication being involved in a particular reasoning. Obviously, in modus ponens from two sentences "p" and "$p{\rightarrow}q$", where '$\rightarrow$' stands for implication, we may infer "q". The implication assumed might be material, intuitionistic, strict, etc. But if, instead of modus ponens we think of its Aristotelian equivalent Barbara, then as Anderson and Belnap note "corresponding to this form of inference there exists a certain true proposition, namely, If M and m, then C."[3] Hence, the implication is involved both as a premise, and as a corresponding propositional explication. The two are not the same, the latter, as Anderson and Belnap argue (by analyzing the case of the enthymematic inference) needs to be "entailment".[4] But this reasoning is based on the assumption that enthymemes are not logically valid inferences.[5] Not everyone shares this view; particularly important position concerning the validity of enthymemes is Robert Brandom's inferentialism.

According to inferentialism validity is a primitive notion while "a distinction between good and bad inferences" is "understood as a distinction between appropriate and inappropriate doings."[6] Hence, enthymemes lacking hypothetical statements can be valid as well; their

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1   H. Field, "Pluralism in Logic", *The Review of Symbolic Logic*, Vol. 2, No 2, June 2009, 342.

2   Ibid. 349.

3   A. R. Anderson, N. D. Belnap, "Enthymemes", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 58, No. 23, 1961, 713.

4   Ibid. 722.

5   Ibid. 714.

6   R. Brandom, *Articulating Reasons*, Harvard University Press, 2000, 12.

form of validity is material validity, which is a kind of formal validity based on fixed non-logical vocabulary.[7] Concerning the status of implication, the consequence of inferentialist's view is that its role in reasoning is not constitutive but just expressive. So the question is: how this is reflected on its normativity?

In answering the above question, I will introduce the notion of semiotic implication which will be defined through semiotic validity, which is validity based on signs. A universal statement "All M is P" or "For all x, if x is M, then x is P" is given a semiotic reading in the following way: "M is an index for P", or "P is an icon for M". It will be argued that semiotic implication is the bearer of normativity.

Key words: normativity, enthymeme, formal validity, semiotic implication.

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7   Ibid. 85.

Damir Smiljanić (invited)

On the Distinction between Descriptive and Prescriptive Metaphilosophy

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In his lecture, the author discusses the role of metaphilosophy, which is primarily concerned with the nature of philosophical thinking. Nicholas Rescher's division of metaphilosophy into descriptive and prescriptive will be important when dealing with that topic. While descriptive metaphilosophy investigates what (historically) counts as philosophy, prescriptive metaphilosophy asks what valid philosophy should be. Thus, one studies the factual situation (e.g. in history of philosophy) and the other tries to determine the value criteria for specific philosophical positions (in which case a position is valid, what makes an argument better than the other, etc.). The author wants to consider the question of whether it is possible for metaphilosophy to be guided by cognitive values without losing its descriptive character. Perhaps precisely "positional neutrality" is the key value, although its acceptance makes the relationship between philosophy and metaphilosophy even more debatable: Is metaphilosophy just a part of philosophy or a discipline *sui generis* with a distance to philosophy? Is it a useful tool for the philosopher or is it redundant? The author will try to defend the disciplinary autonomy of the metaphilosophical approach.

Key words: metaphilosophy, descriptive/prescriptive, cognitive values, positional neutrality, Nicholas Rescher

Thodoris Dimitrakos

Liberal Naturalism and the Scope of Social Sciences: Towards a Historicist Defence of the Autonomy of Normativity

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"Liberal naturalism" (De Caro & Macarthur, 2004, 2010, 2022) stands as an inclusive term for the philosophical accounts which seek for an intermediate position between scientific naturalism and idealism or supernaturalism (Macarthur & DeCaro 2010: 9). Scientific naturalism which is the dominant trend in analytic tradition (Kitcher, 1992: 54; Leiter, 2006: 2; Rorty, 2010: 57) entails that everything that exists is, at the same time, subject matter of the empirical sciences. Empirical-scientific understanding is the only genuine kind of intelligibility. This view leads to the philosophical elimination of the normative content. In particular, it leads to the programmatic thesis that normative explanations (i.e. explanations in terms of showing how a phenomenon is conformed to a norm or set of norms) (Dimitrakos, 2021: 9) can and should be reduced in empirical scientific explanations. Supernaturalism, on the other hand, implies the philosophical commitment to the existence of "entities or qualities or relations" of a very strange sort (Mackie, 1977: 38) and furthermore of a special kind of epistemic faculty (such as mental intuition) (Macarthur & DeCaro 2010: 3). Liberal naturalism aims at preserving the irreducibility of the normative content without appealing to any kind of spooky entities or epistemic faculties.

I suggest that despite their virtues, liberal naturalist accounts face an unwanted dilemma. They must either reject naturalism in the philosophy of social sciences or suggest that there is a part of human thinking and acting that lies outside the scope of empirical research. Social and human sciences focus on the same types of phenomena as normative explanations. Therefore, preserving the autonomy of normativity requires either rejecting the idea that social and human

sciences make their subject matter intelligible in the same way as the natural sciences (naturalism in social sciences) or acknowledging that at least a part of human thinking and acting lies beyond the reach of empirical-scientific understanding.

In this paper, I argue that both sides of the dilemma are undesirable for naturalists. I also argue that the dilemma can be dissolved. To do this, I take John McDowell's "naturalism of second nature" (McDowell, 1996: 86) as my starting point. I follow McDowell in taking the normative problem as an explanatory problem, i.e., a problem concerning the genuineness of different kinds of intelligibility (McDowell, 1996, 78). I also follow McDowell in rejecting empiricism, i.e., the view that nature is equated with the subject matter of empirical sciences ("first nature"). I endorse the idea that "nature includes second nature" (McDowell, 1996, xx), which is the realm of normativity. However, unlike McDowell, I reject a quietist view on the relation between the first and the second nature because it leads to the aforementioned dilemma. I claim that we should not implicitly or explicitly understand the distinction between first and second nature as a demarcation between two different types of phenomena. I provide an argument for why we should understand second nature as knowledge of the first. Depicting second nature as knowledge of the first leaves nothing outside the scope of social sciences and preserves, at the same time, the ineliminability of normative explanations. Furthermore, in divergence from McDowell's view, my account has two main consequences: a) we can only determine various degrees of freedom instead of absolute states of freedom, and b) the content of reason or, in McDowell's (2010) terms, the layout of the space of reasons is historically changeable.

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Aleksandra Vučković

Epistemic Normativity and Quine's Project of Naturalized Epistemology
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In his famous article "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969), Quine established a novel take on the position of epistemology in philosophical and scientific discourse. According to his views, epistemological questions are a subset of psychological questions, and psychology in itself is a branch of natural science. Thus, epistemology, as understood in the Quinean sense, threatens the very idea of its normative aspects, as natural science is empiristic and, as a result, relies on purely descriptive claims. Hence, the following question arises: Does the naturalized account of epistemology entail the rejection of epistemic norms?

Several philosophers have taken up the task of providing the answer to this question. Kornblith (1993) asserts that Quine's epistemic norms are merely an instrument in the specific field of natural science and, thus, that he gives up the requirement for epistemic justification of beliefs. However, Foley (1994) seems to paint Kornblith's interpretation of Quine's epistemology as somewhat reductionist and argues that Quine has never intended to reduce the whole of epistemology to psychology but only to convey the continuum between epistemology and the rest of the science. Roth (1999) claims that Quine's project of naturalized epistemology entails nothing short of explicit normativity insofar as the Quinean epistemologist relies on standards and norms of scientific inquiry. Houkes (2002) shifts the perspective of the discussion once again and claims that epistemological techniques cannot be understood independently of human nature and that Quine's understanding of them as a mere "technology" in the truth-seeking process is inherently misguided, as it would entail intentionality which Quine rejects.

I shall argue that the acceptance (and the rejection) of any of those answers will depend not only on the interpretation of this specific pro-

ject of epistemology naturalized but also on the variations in understanding Quine's take on naturalism in general. Quine (1986, 1990) did not seem particularly entertained by the idea that his project of naturalized epistemology would entail the complete abandonment of normativity. The problem is, however, that his takes on naturalism (and empiricism as well) have taken different forms in various writings throughout his lifetime, with some being inconsistent with the others. In one of my earlier papers (2016; reference omitted for anonymity), I discussed the distinction between naturalism in a methodological sense and naturalism in an ontological sense and argued that the former aligns better with the rest of Quine's views. In this research, I will explore whether Quinean acceptance of naturalism in a methodological sense withstands the criticism regarding the lack of normativity.

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Ognjen Milivojević

A criticism of Searle's account of institutionally creative linguistic acts

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In the *Construction of Social Reality* and the *Making the Social World* (1995 & 2010), Searle presents a theory of institutional reality according to which, ignoring some exceptions, institutional reality is made by collective assignment of status functions, originally, to natural phenomena. Searle understands natural phenomena as entities that exist independently of consciousness, and that do not have a normative dimension. These are entities postulated and studied within the natural sciences, as well as certain entities of everyday experience. Status functions are functions assigned, originally, to these entities that they carry simply because it is collectively accepted that they have them. Status functions have a normative dimension – they entail rights and obligations for those who accept them. According to Searle, institutional reality is a network of institutional facts. Institutional facts take the form:Xcounts as Y in context C, where Y is always a status function. An example of an institutional fact is 'This man (X) is a citizen (Y) of Serbia (C)'.

Laitinen's (2013) refutation of representatives with the double direction of fit, forces us to reconsider Searle's theory of institutional reality, because according to that theory status functiondeclarations, that perform the role of institutionally creative linguistic acts, are understood as a subspecie of such alleged representatives. The direction of fit is a criterion for dividing representatives according to whether the representative should or tends to change in the case ofits disagreement with reality. A representative is said to have a representative-to-the-world direction of fit if it should or tends to change when it doesn't agree with the world, and world-to-representative direction of fit if the world is to change instead. Thus, the job of the former representatives is to represent reality, and the job of the latter is to change it.

According to Searle, status function declarations, therefore, because they have a double direction of fit, allegedly change and represent reality at the same time. In a single sentence, Laitinen's refutation of representatives with double direction of fit consists in showing that their alignment with reality can never be archieved from the position of their original non-alignment with reality.

Taking into account Laitinen's criticism, I argue that commissives, specifically mutual promises that X will be used-considered-represented-counted as Y in the context of C, should be established as institutionally creativelinguisticacts within Searle's theory. Anticipating the objection that self-contradictory declaratives are nested in said commissives, I say, along with Laitinen, that status function declarations, if understood as representatives with a double direction of fit, do not exist, and that, accordingly, said commissives should be understood as not involving the simultaneous changing and representation of reality. They only change reality. I further think that we can continue to use Searle's term 'status function declaration' (as well as related expressions) if it's redefined as a said type of commissive rather than a representation with the double direction of fit.

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Karlo Gardavski

Epistemic practice as normative practice

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The aim of this paper is to point out that the epistemological problems of knowledge and justification, seen from Michael Williams' contextualist point of view, could only be understood as part of social practice or the social practice (game) of giving and asking for reasons. According to Williams, classical foundationalist epistemology could not answer the problems proposed by the skeptics (radical skepticism or philosophical skepticism). Since fundamentalist epistemology was burdened with theoretical necessity, i.e. by devoting itself to its rigid method, it began to create fundamental foundations as an explanatory matrix of knowledge. The problem of knowledge and justification could be solved by creating formal patterns that create their foundations by reducing them to basic axioms, principles, etc. This way of analyzing foundational epistemology or locating its flaws Williams calls theoretical diagnosis. Even if he develops his teaching under the strong influence of the late Wittgenstein, he does not accept Wittgenstein's therapeutic diagnosis (that philosophical problems are pseudo-problems arising from a lack of understanding of the use of language), or at least some parts of it. Williams believes that the question of knowledge is an important philosophical question; however, it did not have a fruitful way of dealing with the skeptical problems. Williams realizes that skeptical problems, whether ancient (Agrippa) or modern (Descartes), are the reason for the emergence of a form of theorizing in philosophy. Skepticism and epistemological foundationalism are two sides of the same coin. His cure for the virus of skepticism is epistemological contextualism, which views knowledge and justification from a social, pragmatic and contextual dimension. Epistemology views knowledge (statement of knowledge) as a product of epistemic practice. The ways in which epistemic claims can appear are as diverse as the number

of language games that the participants of a community can play. Epistemic practice, as a part of language practice, has its own normative structure that can be expressed in a deontic vocabulary. On the basis of this structure, the participants of an epistemic/linguistic practice are committed to accept certain claims. Commitment is a social act of accepting norms that are products of language communities. Committing to certain claims would also mean committing to whether someone knows something or not. The classic concept of justification is less important because saying something without justification does not mean saying something wrongfully. Williams, on the trail of late Wittgenstein, argues (and so does this paper) that for epistemological problems, foundationalist theories or methods are redundant. Having a method would mean that the motley of epistemic/linguistic practice would be reduced to a single normative pattern. Having a method would mean having only one way of understanding the problem of knowledge (that is, having only one way of understanding epistemic statements and nothing more), and thus, for Williams, epistemic statements are decontextualized.

Safer Grbić

Presentation of the normativity of Parmenides'
teaching about "being" and its influence on the
later development of philosophical teachings
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Ancient thinking about what is constitutes the fundamental thinking in the history of ontology – and, in fact, the history of thinking about what is has developed through ancient efforts to answer ontological questions. In this vein, historians of philosophy designate Parmenides as the founder of the ontological question of εἶναι, which was subsequently developed throughout the history of philosophy and first most significantly expounded in Plato's teaching about τὸ ὄν and Aristotle's teaching about οὐσία. The well-known thesis in the history of philosophy is that of the evident influence of Plato on Aristotle and his teaching, despite Aristotle's efforts to be critical of Plato and his work in his own works. On the other hand, the thesis of Parmenides' influence on Plato's and Aristotle's teachings is less known, primarily because Plato and Aristotle often adopted a critical stance towards tradition, especially towards Parmenides' ontological teaching about what is. Finally, if we more thoroughly consider the problem of the Parmenides-Plato-Aristotle relationship, then we can ask about thinking strategies and move from the question 'what is' to the question 'how is what is' – that is, from questioning Parmenides' thinking to questioning how Parmenides' thinking is done. In this way, what was previously unknown, and what is hypothesized in this paper, is reflected in the proof of Parmenides' immediate influence on the constitution of what is in Plato's generic teaching about what is and Aristotle's categorical teaching about what is – thus on the entirety of their work as well as the entire history of thinking through neoplatonism and aristotelianism. The ultimate goal of this paper, in line with the postulated hypothesis, is to prove that – despite Plato's and especially Aristotle's criticism of tradition – Parmenides' teaching

on the constitution of what is was not the subject of their revisionism, and therefore, it was not fundamentally Parmenides' teaching, but rather an explanation of the Greek spirit. As a result, Parmenides' incorporation of Greek thinking in his teaching about what is delivers it normatively.

Rastko Jevtić
Normativity in Descartes' philosophy

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Since Descartes didn't use the term "normativity", my approach to this topic can't be to try to extract and interpret the claims that contain it. In order to understand interesting things that Descartes had to say, I will simply assume that normativity is about evaluations of things as *good* or *bad* (or at least *relevant*) and that these evaluations go hand in hand with feelings.

On my first approximation there are two different strains of Descartes' theorizing about normativity. The first has the notion of *passions* (Descartes uses the term "passions" to talk about emotions generally) as its key notion. The second one has the notion of *health* at its forefront. In both cases, Descartes is interested in the "ontological source" of values – things that enable/generate the evaluation.

The last paragraph of the *The Passions of the Soul* is important for the first strain of thought. It is titled: *It is on the passions alone that all the good and evil of this life depends*. While writing about the soul, Descartes claims: "the pleasures common to it and the body depend entirely on the passions" (AT XI 488). This passage is, in a sense, a) *emotivistic*, b) *reductionistic,* and c) *hedonistic*. a) is true if Descartes claims that most of/all types of evaluative judgements are expressions of emotions. b) is true if Descartes claims that most of/all other values wouldn't exist without emotions. c) is true if Descartes claims that (un)pleasantness is the usual/necessary component of evaluation. The purpose of this segment of my talk is to examine if a), b) and c) can be supported by primary text generally.

The second strain is concerned with *health* as "the greatest good" i.e. the source of all value: "... perfect health ... is the foundation of all the other goods that one can have in this life" (AT IV 220). It is hard to define the notion of health using the fundamental notions of Descartes' metaphysics, but this must be done in order to fully comprehend the weight and the implications of this claim.

The tension between these strains of thought can be resolved if the interconnectedness of two key notions is made explicit. Descartes' claim about the relation between bodily states and sensations does exactly this: "... the best system that could be devised is that movement of it (pineal gland) should produce the one sensation which, of all possible sensations, is most especially and most frequently conducive to the perservation of the healthy man. ...the sensations which nature has given us are all of this kind". (AT VII 87). Since there can be no doubt that passions are sensations for Descartes (AT XI 349–350), the conclusion is that all the passions contribute to health, and thus are "all by nature good". In return, health enables humans to experience and interpret passions as good. There is no relation of priority, since both notions describe crucial, interrelated aspects of human beings.

Anastasija Filipović

Enactive Theory as a New Framework
for Virtue Epistemology

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In this presentation, I will aspire to explore connection between enactive theory and virtue epistemology. Main goal will be to show how enactive approach towards cognition and affectivity can help us understand the role of a subject in the knowledge process.

Broadly speaking, virtue epistemology aims to exhibit how epistemic subjects have an active role in knowledge acquisition. For that reason, this theory focuses on virtues that a certain subject possesses. There are two main understandings of the virtue concept: responsibilism and reliabilism. Responsibilists, such as Linda Zagzebski (2001), claim that subjects obtain and develop intellectual virtues during lifetime; they are responsible for their intellectual progress because they exercise their intellectual virtues. On the other hand, reliabilists, such as John Greco (2000), assert that subjects, using their cognitive abilities, assist in epistemic process. Subjects are cognitive agents who are motivated to get to the truth and act in ways that are reliable because of their motive. In this case, motivation gives rise to reliable processes which, in majority of instances, result in knowledge.

Enactive theory advocates for embodied approach towards cognition as well as close relatedness between biological and phenomenological levels of cognitive explanation. According to Evan Thompson (2007), cognition arises from the use of know-how in situated actions. Skillful know-how is defined as recurrent sensorimotor pattern of perception and action which gives rise to cognitive abilities. Moreover, it could be argued that cognition and affection are intertwined and enactive theory recognizes this congruence. From my perspective, they are aspects of the same mental process that can be explained using theory of dynamical systems.

In my opinion, enactive theory can reconcile divergence between reliabilism and responsibilism while providing effective cognitive and affective framework for virtue epistemology. Enactivism concentrates on the role of the active cognitive subject in the environment. Our cognitive abilities arise from the special, masterly actions with the world around us and the same can be said for knowledge acquisition as well. We use our cognitive abilities to explore the environment and learn facts about the objects and other living beings. Agency, cognitive abilities and intellectual virtues are, as such, necessary in the knowledge process. Even more, affective states, especially emotions, also have significant impact on epistemic procedure. According to Laura Candiotto (2019), emotions are strong motivational forces in search for knowledge. They enhance epistemic cooperation by creating epistemic groups that are crucial for productive scientific work. I argue that relation between agencies, cognitive abilities, intellectual virtues and affective states can be explained using dynamical systems model. From my perspective, these phenomena are all closely linked, with no precise boundaries in between. For that reason, dynamical model seems as methodologically correct explanation. Furthermore, interaction between these components results in action with the world, which, consequently, results in knowledge earning. Thus, I believe enactivism provides effective framework for virtue epistemology.

Key words: enactivism, affects, responsibilism, reliabilism, agency

Nikola Jandrić

The Problem of Normativity in Subject Naturalist Pragmatic Metavocabularies

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Huw Price proposes a novel version of what Amanda Bryant calls logico/lexical naturalism (Bryant 2020) in claiming that we could still be naturalists even if we don't subscribe to the project of analyzing every philosophically "problematic" vocabulary into a naturalistically acceptable one (Price 2010; 2013; 2019). His naturalism is a *pragmatic* one, the thesis of which is cashed out in terms of analyzing, in naturalistically acceptable vocabulary, the *practices* of using a particular vocabulary – the analysis being performed in a *pragmatic* metavocabulary – rather than analyzing the conceptual and propositional contents of that vocabulary *into* conceptual and propositional contents of a naturalistically acceptable vocabulary – the analysis being performed in a *semantic* metavocabulary. Such analysis is further informed by Price's anti-representationalism which rejects the view that what makes utterances contentful is their representing reality. So, to elaborate an alternative notion of content, Price calls upon Brandom's inferentialist semantics (Brandom 1994; 2000). Brandom derives his inferentialist semantics from pragmatics, the starting point being the practice of asserting, where assertion is to be understood as a move in a game or practice of giving and asking for reasons. Every assertion is a reason *for* and *against* something, and it is itself in need of reasons, that is, asserting something *commits* one to asserting something else, and if challenged needing to provide an *entitlement* for the original assertion. From such relations between practical claimings – described in a *normative* pragmatic metavocabulary – Brandom reconstructs inferential relations between contents thus claimed and so presents his inferentialist semantics. I want to claim that Price cannot recruit Brandom's inferentialism for his subject naturalist project, since the set of naturalistically acceptable (meta-)vocabularies does not include

normative vocabulary needed for pragmatically reconstructing inferentialist semantics. Further, I will claim that the Price's project is a non-starter because without a normative vocabulary to describe the practice of asserting, we cannot offer a plausible pragmatic metavocabulary for any vocabulary whatsoever, since we would have no way of reconstructing conceptual contents a vocabulary. Thus, we would be left with no way to distinguish between particular vocabularies, nor between practices of asserting and other practices. The conclusions will be taken to show that the so-called "post-Rortyan metalinguistic pragmatism" should not commit to using naturalistic pragmatic metavocabularies. The overarching suggestion will be that if we are to be pragmatists in the sense of using pragmatic metavocabularies in our analysis, we should side with Brandom. A further point will be that the pragmatist naturalism is not the form a naturalist project should take, and given the reasons that motivate Price's subject naturalism space will be open for a stronger conclusion of the untenability of logico/lexical naturalism generally.

Key words: normativity, pragmatism, naturalism, practices, propositional content, inferentialism

Shih-Hao Liu

Modal Normativism, Referential Success, and the Ideal Rule-follower
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According to Thomasson's modal normativism, claims about metaphysical possibilities and necessities need not be understood as descriptive claims about the discovery of a mindindependent modal reality. Instead, these claims are regulative claims that express semantic rules in our object language. For instance, the modal claim "Necessarily, bachelors are unmarried men" expresses that "bachelors are unmarried men" is an actual semantic rule. And anyone who disagrees with the claim does not understand or makes a mistake with the actual semantic rules associated with 'bachelor', 'unmarried', and 'men'. On the other hand, the modal claim like "Possibly, US president is a female" expresses that applying 'US president' to a female is permitted by our actual semantic rules. In this way, Thomasson aims at offering an integrative account that demystifies metaphysical modality both epistemologically and metaphysically. Metaphysically, we don't need to postulate eccentric entities like Lewisian concrete possible worlds to make sense of modal reality. Epistemologically, modal normativism offers a straightforward norm-based route to elucidate our knowledge about metaphysical modality. We know what is possible and necessary simply by reflecting on semantic rules behind the usage of terms.

In this paper, I criticize Thomasson's account by arguing that it gives an implausible epistemological picture regarding our actual practice of reference. According to Thomasson, there are some semantic rules that we must conform to qualify as being able to use a term like the semantic rules related to a term's kind. For example, for her, it is questionable whether an individual who fails to assent to the modal claim "Necessarily, water is H_2O" is fully competent in using the term 'water' or 'H_2O'. I argue that this seems to place a high standard

regarding referential success. Furthermore, this is in conflict with our actual referential practice. It seems that in many examples we refer to things based on contingent features of a thing. Or we can refer and communicate without agreeing on some important modal claims of a thing. This suggests that the semantic rules can be "modally too thin" to accomplish jobs assigned by Thomasson's account. It is possible that an individual can refer to a thing but is modally ignorant. In response, Thomasson might introduce an ideal rule-follower that is similar to the ideal observer in the discussion of metaethics and aesthetics. She might argue that as long as the linguistic community conforms to some minimal set of rules followed by an ideal rule-follower, individuals can refer to the same thing stably. However, I respond that this might bring further difficulty that is similar to the problem of old-fashioned modal conventionalism. Since it is we who select the ideal rule-follower and our selection is merely a contingent move, the consult to the ideal rule-follower cannot secure the metaphysical necessity needed for modal normativists. I conclude that reflecting on the epistemological aspect of modal normativism gives some reason to reject it.

Saskia Janina Neumann

Beliefs about the future – how what will have been decides on how we are justified

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The importance of the justification of our beliefs is a long-debated question (cf. Watson, 2023). The question of how our memory beliefs are justified, however, is a question we have usually neglected as our memory does not seem to draw much attention to itself. As long as it works, we do not even notice that we use it most of the time (Frise, 2023).

In my opinion, the question of how our memory beliefs are justified, however, should get a bigger role in the philosophical debate. The reason for this claim is that most of our beliefs are memory beliefs. A position, I will argue for during my presentation. Based on empirical findings in Cognitive Science (Baddeley 2020, 1999), I will explain that our memory is not only involved in forming beliefs about the past but more controversially in forming beliefs about the present and even more controversially in forming beliefs about the future.

If beliefs about what has been, about what is the case in the present and even about what will have been the case in the future are memory beliefs, reconsidering our strict focus on the justification of mere beliefs seems to be a change in debate worth considering.

Key words: Memory, Philosophy of Memory, Belief, Cognitive Science, Epistemology of Memory, Philosophy of Cognitive Science

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Martina Giovine

Gender-fair language:
against hierarchies of power

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This research addresses the topic of gender-fair language from a moral point of view, supported by some experimental studies. Language is not a neutral tool: with words we express concepts, feelings, intentions; and, on the other hand, we can hurt, convey stereotypes, reinforce social hierarchies. These hierarchies manifest themselves in turn in linguistic androcentrism and – in a circular relationship – the linguistic androcentrism feeds social inequalities. In languages whose terms are marked by grammatical gender (German, Spanish, Italian, etc.), among the main linguistic devices under discussion, we find the so-called "overextended masculine", namely the misuse of the masculine grammatical gender to represent all humanity (Sczesny, Formanowicz, Moser, 2016). Furthermore, gender binarism – which is implicit in the grammatical structure – excludes non-binary people (Dembroff, 2018). In this talk, I will argue that it is ethically correct to question the androcentric character of language and to apply linguistic strategies from an inclusive perspective. This thesis is motivated by the fact that linguistic androcentrism has an impact on the reinforcement of gender hierarchies with clear social consequences. After placing the topic in a moral context, I will shift the focus to the identification of the main androcentric linguistic devices of the Italian language. Finally, I will present some experimental studies discussed by Sczesny, Formanowicz and Moser, that show that language can have consequences on cognitive representation. In conclusion, the thesis I argue is that we cannot ignore gender inequalities from a linguistic point of view and that we need to pay attention to words in order to adopt a gender-fair language.

Key words: stereotypes, inclusivity, language, gender, androcentrism

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BAF+: Normativity
of Art

Ted Kinnaman (keynote)
Normativity in Art in Kant's Aesthetics
Department of Philosophy, George Mason University

My topic is normativity with regard to art in Kant's aesthetic theory. In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant tells us that whereas beauty in nature if at the same time it looks like art, "art can be beautiful only if we are aware that it is art and yet looks to us like nature." (5:306) This tidy formulation suggests a problem for the validity of Kant's aesthetics in the 20th and 21st centuries. Kant wrote in an era where it was largely assumed that the goal of art was to represent nature, in some very broad way. But even in the broadest sense, some of the most important art of the last 100 years or so has neither been directed toward nature nor striven for beauty. Can Kant's aesthetic theory give us any insight at all into why, for example, Duchamp's "Fountain" or John Cage's "4'33"" are judged to be great works of art? I want to suggest that it can, given a clear understanding of the relation between nature and beauty.

The theory of taste laid out in the first part of the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" is the foundation for the account of art that appears later on. So it makes sense to draw one understanding of normativity through both parts of the text. I will begin by laying out what I think is the most plausible reading of Kant's account of aesthetic normativity. As I read Kant, our justification for expecting that others should agree with our judgments of taste derives from the idea that in judging something to be beautiful, we are judging it to be suitable for cognition *überhaupt*. This crucial phrase refers to cognition in the broadest sense, the criterion for which is the possibility of building a systematic hierarchy of empirical cognition. Kant in fact tells us in the introduction to the work that this is the central concern of the *Critique of Judgment*, and that the portion of the book devoted to aesthetic judgment is where that concern is addressed. Then I will draw from this account two consequences for normativity in art. First, by connecting beauty with cognition, Kant's theory offers a justification for

art in general, in implicit reply to Plato's exclusion of art and poetry from the utopian ideal sketched out in the *Republic*. Second, reading Kant as I suggest helps to make Kant's theory of taste clearly relevant to recent art, much of which has been concerned neither with representing nature nor with expressing beauty. Here, too, the key point is that, on the present reading, taste is a mode of cognition. Although he certainly did think of art as representation of nature, Kant's actual criterion for beauty in art is that it "advances the cultivation of the mental powers for sociable communication." Thus "Fountain" can be beautiful, in Kant's sense, if spurs the cultivation of the mental powers—a perfectly plausible outcome.

Una Popović & Srđan Šarović (invited)
The Normativity Of Poetic Order
Faculty of Philosophy UNS / Academy of Arts UNS

In this paper, we would like to address the issue of normativity from the perspective of aesthetics, focusing on the work of art. Our position is the one endorsing the autonomy of the artwork. Firstly, we will argue that the work of art has its own inner normativity – that is, that the work of art is based upon and constituted through its inherent (aesthetic) law and norm. The inherent norm of the artwork is equal to its ontology, its meaning and the way of its production, and it also impacts the reception of the artwork. Further, we will argue that the inherent norm and normativity of the artwork is (its) aesthetic principle, i.e. (its) artistic method. The aesthetic principle (the artistic method) is the way of conducting artwork's inherent meaning to some particular composition of elements and appearance. Therefore, the artwork's inner normativity is the normativity of an inner poetic order. The aesthetic principle directs operating with the technical procedure of an artwork's creation in a meaningful way. In terms of artwork creation, the artistic method is first defined as fundamental law, and (only) then the method directs the process towards a particular media and technology used in the very act of making the artwork. Finally, we will argue that the inner norm, embodied in the method, and the aesthetic principle of the artwork can be comprehended solely through the artwork itself. Since the artwork is created according to the artistic method corresponding to the aesthetic principle, the principle is embodied in the artwork so that all its elements and the final composition manifest the principle. Therefore, the artwork's inner norm and normativity can be comprehended through the artistic method, as well as through its created appearance. The resulting conclusion is that the aesthetic criteria for understanding and evaluating the artwork belong to the artwork as such; they are offspring of the aesthetic principle essential and integral to the artwork. Consequently, any criteria or norms having other origins have no legitimacy when applied to the work of art.

Key words: aesthetic normativity, artwork, artistic method, aesthetic principle, poetic order

Svetoslava Georgieva (invited)

Is anti-normativity normative in Postmodern visual arts?

University of Veliko Trnovo, Department of Fine Arts

Postmodernism, as a critique of the myth of originality, is the delicate substitute for the existing focus on aesthetics and examining works of art through the prism of its conceptual groups and categories until the middle of the 20th century. Norms were disappearing fast in a short period of time since the early Avant-Garde. The ideas of postmodernism have changed not only art but also social attitudes on fundamental issues. Anti-normativity, opposing or countering what is normative in the art appears as an incorporation of the ideas of rebellion, denial of the past, and praise of novelty, innovation, and anything that hasn't been seen or done before, crossing all possible boundaries.

Different theoretical concepts emerged as practical tools of classification that create similarities or differences, in the struggle for recognition by the artists or their accredited critics, as a function of brands that distinguish galleries, groups, and artists, and therefore the artworks as products for sale. All old artistic norms have been rejected with the ideas of the Postmodern which imperceptibly appeared, which are based on the ideas about identities, the individual and the social, freedom, responsibility, and power. We often hear definitions like aboriginal art, queer art, feminist art, black art, poststructural art, etc. If in the past the artist was limited by artistic-aesthetic norms, then in contemporary art the normativity has been changed, as well as the very image of the artist, who increasingly has the function of an intellectual.

Since the 80s of the 20th century, restrictions have crept unnoticed in how the artist is represented. His image has already been institutionalized. That created the feeling of intentionality and lack of originality in many works and some problems with legal normativity too.

These elements of artistic practice are increasingly visible, and the controversy surrounding topics related to appropriation and similar approaches is increasing. Nowadays, the names of artists such as Richard Prince, Jeff Koons, Barbara Kruger, Thierry Guetta, Nadia Plessner will remain legal precedents in numerous copyright cases.

Sylvia Borissova (invited)
Aesthetic Experience and Normativity in a Process Axiological Perspective
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences,
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology

Values are what an individual's life centers around, what defines their choices and who they are. Values of the individual – even before they are differentiated into moral, aesthetic, cognitive, social, etc. are not given, but are gradually realized through the process of upbringing, training, education and/or therapy, as well as through actions in the individual's life that put these values in one's daily experience. They are not yet abstract ideals and they are not personal ideals – although they carry such potential. When one begins to realize these values, in the very process of realization the individual experiences joy, feels complete and authentic: and, more precisely said, this process to and end and completion cumulating joy is the essence of aesthetic experience (Dewey 1934).

It is in this context that the process axiological orientation of approaching the problem of values in the development and building of the personality is laid. Globally, only in the last few years efforts have been observed to single out the field of axiological procedural ethics (Edwards 2014) based on an original combination of Nicolai Hartmann's formal axiology and Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy, and a decade earlier (Henning 2002, 2005) – of an aesthetics of morality derived from Whitehead's process philosophy, and of the stake of an "ecstatic" challenge to Whitehead's universe of values.

On this process axiological basis, this report aims to systematically examine the types of relation between aesthetic experience and normativity. In *Art as Experience* Dewey notes that aesthetic experience is also a moral experience, and they diverge only in the cases when the moral is recognized in the experience normatively and not intrinsically. So the pledge of this report is to typologize the cases where

aesthetic experience and normativity meet – in its coming upon epistemic norms, action norms (including ethical norms), social norms, cultural norms, art norms – and thus explicit the limits, transformations and shifts of aesthetic experience as a plastic value-forming experience of the individual, expressing their personality and authenticity.

Key words: aesthetic experience, value, normativity, process axiology, Whitehead, Dewey

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Milan Popadić (keynote)
Can a Monument Be Bad?
Normativity and Commemorative Values in Public Space
University of Belgrade, Department of Art History

A monument is usually understood as an entity (sculpture, building, landmark...) erected (or recognized) as a sign of memory of a person or event. This is aplicable regardless of the type of monuments (private, public, cultural); what differs is the type of memory (wich, in this sense, again can be private, public, cultural). From that basic division, all other divisions of the monuments into different types are derived (for example, by form, by historical period, by social function...). That is why when we talk about monuments, it is always about memory of someone or something. Hence, the basic value attached to monuments is *commemorative value*. A commemorative value could be understood as the content (memory) that is kept in the minds via the monument. Thus, it is possible to say: if it has a commemorative value, then it is a monument. Or in normativistic terms, *a monument is ought to have a commemorative value*. That seems clear and understandable. However, there are many examples, some very recent, of monuments being destroyed or removed because of their commemorative value. In other words, they were considered unacceptable to be public monuments precisely because they met their monument "norms", namely to commemorate someone or something. In our time, monuments are most often destroyed or removed because they allegedly represented symbols of racism, colonialism, hegemony. Their commemorative values do not match the current social values of the public. But is it the responsibility of the monuments? Does that make them "bad"? Are we confusing commemorative value with celebration or glorification? Do we blame monuments for human faults? Because the monument cannot be "racist" or "colonialist"; people can. Can we learn to live with

monuments we "disagree" with, not because they glorify unwanted ideas, but because they remind us of our own weaknesses and delusions? Do the monuments (that we accuse of extolling unacceptable values), by performing their commemorative service and so remind us of the dark side of human nature, actually enable us to better understand the human condition? Do "bad" monuments make "better" people? If so, how can these monuments be "bad"?

Key words: monuments, commemorative values, public, removal and destruction of monuments

Ivan Popov (invited)

When is art interactive?

Department of German and Scandinavian Studies
Sofia, University St. Kliment Ohridski

The predicate "interactive" has enjoyed popularity in the philosophy of art in recent years, serving to analyze art forms that emerge as a result of the application of new technologies to the artistic processes. A famous example is the definition of computer art as interactive, proposed by Dominic Lopes. The problematic is also very relevant in today's Bulgarian discourse on art, in which the opposition between contemporary and traditional art forms dominates the discussion. The paper traces how convincing the identification of "contemporary" with "interactive" is, given that the meaning of the latter term is actually quite vague and serves to designate any situation in which the audience does not simply "contemplate" the artwork but is called upon to do something. The paper offers a critical analysis of the possibilities to define interactive art as a distinct art form and hence a subject to specific norms of identification and evaluation. It also pursues the empirical goal of describing the ways in which a given concept enters the artistic communication of a particular national tradition (in this case: the Bulgarian), generating meanings whose philosophical understanding is still to come.

Nikola Tanasić (invited)
AI Image Generator sand the Nature of Revolutions in Art
New Serbian Political Thought

With the global advent of machine learning and various digital platforms branded with the popular buzzword *artificial intelligence* (*AI*), the public already seems to have forgotten that the mass spread of these now ubiquitous technologies started in the year 2022 in a domain usually considered *the last place* robots will reach in their plight to substitute human beings in everything they do – *art*. Although different (for lack of a better term) "AI" technologies – ranging from text processors to sound synthesizers and vocaloids to image processors – existed and have been in use by artists for years (and even decades) now, it was the so-called *AI image generators* that first entered truly massive use at a global scale, thus marking the beginning of the "AI revolution" in the IT industry. This – from a historical point of view – short-lived art fad, which lasted approximately as long as it took the different companies to train their AI models and feed them data, opened a fair deal of traditional philosophical questions, as well as at least a few new ones. The popularity of these platforms among ordinary users, not trained in art beyond elementary and middle education proved that classical questions of aesthetics – such as "what is art?", "how do we distinguish artistic from non-artistic production?", what makes someone an artist?", or "how do we evaluate authorship and intellectual property in hybrid art forms?" – are still alive and culturally relevant in our time. But there was also something else, even more important: the flooding of social networks with "AI art" proved that humanity has a forgotten, yet a basic and powerful need to express itself through visual art. *Internet memes*, for example, have been an essential modern form of communication for a while now, yet simplistic, vulgar, and aesthetically unattractive form has been taken for granted as somewhat of a necessity in this particular form of visual expression. With AI image

generators, however, literally all limits from what a meme can look like have been lifted, and this is just one example of the revolutionary change brought about by this technology, which is probably only comparable in its effects with the discovery of photography in the 19th century. Yet, even more interesting than the different applications of these platforms (and the waves they made in the world of so-called "real art") is the process of development of AI art types, forms, and aesthetics, recreating before our eyes the history of visual art over a short span of just a few months. There have been whole "schools" and "styles" of AI art popping up and disappearing in a matter of days or weeks, passing rapidly from "archaic" to "classical" to "post-classical" variants. During that time, the aesthetic quality of generated images did not follow the general development of platforms' technical abilities, learning to be more precise with following textual prompts. The process sheds additional light on the role of visual arts in modern society, as well as the complex ways we evaluate and perceive visual images as "art", making it probably the most intriguing topic in philosophy of art and aesthetics of our time.

Key words: *AI* art, aesthetics, revolution, visual art, development

Isidora Novaković

Philosophical Value of Literature:
Machiavelli and Shakespeare
University of Belgrade, Department of Philosophy,
MA Student

Despite differences, philosophy and literature share some points. Approaching the same topics differently, literature can give us plastic examples that can help us understand universal philosophical ideas and theories better. Can we talk of universal truths in literature; can we rightfully claim that the statements we find in literature are true or false? In what relation to truth do philosophy and literature stand? What is the skeptics' take regarding the normativity of literature, its artistic and, firstly, its truth value?

The relationship between philosophy and literature will be demonstrated by examples from relevant Shakespeare's plays. It will be shown that philosophy and literature can talk about the same significant truths, e.g. about human nature, motivation and ambition. In this way Shakespeare can lead us to deeper insights into philosophical ideas. The debate between aesthetic cognitivists and aesthetic non-cognitivists that concerns the cognitive value of art, the question of whether art can teach us something in the true sense of the word is significant. The idea is to show that Shakespeare's plays can serve the purpose of answering some philosophical questions. While asking about the normativity of art, we should also examine whether its value depends on the social context. This will be the content of the first part of the paper and it will be connected with epistemology insofar as it will be discussed whether we learn through reading literature.

The second part of the paper will deal more closely with the relationship between Shakespeare and Machiavelli. A comparative analysis of parts of the works of these two authors will be provided in order to illuminate similarities and indicate how Shakespeare's plays can help us interpret Machiavelli's thoughts expressed, above all, in *The Prince*.

Dealing with the relationship between the two authors, it will be inevitable to ask about the relationship between artistic and moral value, or its lack, as well as whether Shakespeare's texts can offer us a basis for normative claims about Machiavelli's ideas. Does Shakespeare provide us with a set of norms and rules for the (right) interpretation of Machiavelli's texts? Although often overlooked, Machiavelli distinguishes between exemplary rulers (whom he advises) and tyrants. The failed governments will be shown by using the examples of particular Shakespeare's characters, such as Macbeth, Richard III and King Lear, who didn't listen to Machiavelli's prescribed advice and twisted it. What are assumed to be common themes for the two authors are Machiavelli's concepts of fortune (the force that changes the rulers' destiny) and *virtù* (virtue in Machiavelli's use of the word that differs from its standard use). Both authors use irony which makes them sound more radical if interpreted literally, and both of them talk of conspiracies and power plays as an indication of the rulers' constant instability on the throne. All of this should help us understand the similarities between their thoughts on these concepts.

The last part of the paper will summarize the main ideas and offer an attempt to answer the questions posed in the text.

Key words: philosophy, literature, Shakespeare's plays, Machiavelli, politics, fortune, virtù, irony, conspiracies, Machiavellianism

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BAF: Invited
Individual
Talks

Marina Bakalova (keynote)
Vicarious Remembering of Feelings through Music
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Bulgaria

According to the simulation theory of memory (Michaelian 2016a, 2016b), remembering amounts to reliably imagining a past event. A radicalized version of simulationsim (Michaelian 2023) states that one can remember an event without having experienced that event at all. Proponents of simulationism argue that the apparent implausibility of their claim is not a reason to reject the proposal, since it is supported by recent empirical discoveries about the nature of remembering. In this talk, I want to push the simulation theory even further. I will try to show that, granted the capacity of music to transmit knowledge of how certain experiences feel to us, it is possible not only to remember events without having actually experienced them, but also to remember how such events felt to someone who did experience them.

Mircea Dumitru (keynote)

New Perspectives on Compositionality. Kit Fine's Semantic Relationist Approach to Meaning

University of Bucharest, Romanian Academy, Romania

The paper is an assessment of compositionality from the vantage point of Kit Fine's semantic relationist approach to meaning. This relationist view is deepening our conception about how the meanings of propositions depend not only on the semantic features and roles of each separate meaningful unit in a complex but also on the relations that those units hold to each other. The telling feature of the formal apparatus of this Finean relationist syntax and semantics, viz. the coordination scheme, has some unexpected consequences that will emerge against the background of an analogy with the counterpart theoretic semantics for modal languages.

The program defends 'referentialism' in philosophy of language; Fine holds that semantic relations that have to be added to the assigned intrinsic values in our semantic theory, especially the relation which he calls 'coordination', can do much of the work of (Fregean) sense. A relationist referentialism has certain important explanatory virtues which it shares with the Fregean position, but the former is better off ontologically than the latter, since it is not committed to the existence of sense.